challenged the district court's Chevron analysis. 66 Similar varied approaches remain the current state of Chevron step one jurisprudence in several other circuit courts of appeals. 1, 14-15 (1998) (summarizing minority view among proponents of interpretive model of Chevron, that textualistjudges are more like to defer to agency interpretation Russell. Geiser, Villanova Law Review, 2009. 1986) (examining statute's text and legislative history before proceeding to Chevron step two. Nonetheless, Justice Breyer concluded that "because of the technical nature of the language in question examination of statutory purpose at the outset was necessary to "illuminate the Court's subsequent analysis" of the text. 2004) (finding no clear congressional intent at Chevron step one after consideration of text and legislative history owcp. Geiser worked in Germany and Austria after the war, until he applied for a United States visa in 1956. Term 2 steps of Chevron, definition (1) whether Congress has spoken to precise question at issue (INS.
See lawson, 2009 interpretation 4 4 textualism. 87 In Geiser, the Third Circuit expressly addressed, for the first time, whether a court may examine legislative history in discerning congressional intent at Chevron step one.8 8 Explaining that Third Circuit cases support analysis of statutory text only, and emphasizing recent Supreme Court cases. 12 7 Moreover, interpreting Geiser to permit the use of legislative history at Chevron step one to resolve textual ambiguity is consistent with a long line of Third Circuit as well as Supreme Court cases, which consult legislative history at the first stage of Chevron. 8 5 In the other cases, however, the Third Circuit found statutory text ambiguous at Chevron step one, but step one, and stating that analysis only proceeds to second step when all "devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear. 62 Therefore, use of legislative history to cast light upon enacted statutory text undermines the democratic rule of law by enabling judges to intervene in the lawmaking process. 6 With this two-part formulation, Chevron replaced ad hoc deference factors with a basic test to determine whether deference to an agency's statutory interpretation is due. Interpretations.3 9 Indeed, it is possible to read Chevron narrowly, as a sheer application of prior precedent in which deference was possible only when an agency applied the law to a set of facts, while pure questions of law continued to be reviewed de novo. (responding to Justice Stevens's concurrence). As Sloan succinctly describes: (1) the argument that the use of legislative history is undemocratic is grounded in the premise that it is not enacted; (2) the argument that legislative history is unreliable is grounded in the premise that "history is often conflicting, and may.
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