for the B-feeling-proposition. So Lewis's identity theory is well-placed to deal with them. Instead of worrying just what a name inside the scope of a modal operator might mean, we translate the language of quantified modal logic into a language without operators, but with quantifiers over worlds and other non-actual individuals. Granted, one of the most deeply rooted realist and antirealist disagreements has been whether moral language expresses things literally. Some a dream that come true essay philosophers will agree that free will can't be located in the scientific world-view, so that's a reason to expand our metaphysical picture to include free will, perhaps as a new primitive.
Indeed, I may even have thesis repository tu delft strong evidence that I have both of these properties. The antirealist could be a non-descriptivist in rejecting premise (1 no moral sentences are true for they do not describe how the world is; or, she may reject a version of the correspondence theory of truth by denying premise (2 she may argue that. That's because any set is just the fusion of the singletons of its members. The second category includes questions of whether moral judgments are universal or relative, of one kind or many kinds, etc. From this, must we then infer that there are entities like moral goodness and obligation to which moral language refers in the world?